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Abstract: Chalmers argues against physicalism using the premise that no truth
about consciousness is deducible a priori from purely structural truths, and later
defines what it is for a truth to be structural, which turns out to include
spatiotemporal truths. But Chalmers then defines spatiotemporal terms by
reference to their role in causing spatiotemporal experiences. Stoljar and Ebbers
argue that these definitions allow for the trivial falsification of Chalmers premise
about structure and consciousness. I show that this result can be avoided by
tweaking the relevant premise, and that this tweak is not ad hoc.
Daniel Stoljar and Melissa Ebbers have recently argued that two key parts
of the metaphysical framework developed by David Chalmers are incom-
patible. On the one hand, this framework is committed to a principled con-
ceptual separation between consciousness, understood as ‘non-structural’,
and physics, understood as ‘structural’. We can formulate this as follows:
Non-Entailment (NE): No truth about consciousness follows a priori from
any set of purely structural truths.
This principle, together with the claim that physics can teach us only
structural truths, serves both as an argument against physicalism (Chalmers,
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2002, 2010) and also as a principled explanation of what underlies the
intuitive plausibility of other arguments against physicalism, such as the
conceivability argument and the knowledge argument (see esp. Alter,
2016). Philosophical zombies are conceivable because their full physical de-
scription is purely structural and so does not entail any consciousness; Mary
does not knowwhat it’s like to see red because her complete physical knowl-
edge is purely structural and so does not entail knowledge of consciousness.
But to understand Non-Entailment we need some understanding of the
notion of ‘structure’. While there are several ways to understand this (see
Alter and Nagasawa, 2012; McClelland, 2013; Pereboom, 2014; Alter,
2016; cf. Stoljar, 2014, 2015, pp. 7–13), Chalmers’ way is to define a struc-
tural truth as one that is a priori equivalent to one formulable in a certain
restricted set of terms, specifically ‘spatiotemporal expressions, nomic ex-
pressions, and mathematical and logical expressions’ (2010, p. 120 n17).
Thus NE says we cannot reach conclusions about consciousness if we start
from premises formulated in only these terms.
The difficulty concerns the meaning of spatiotemporal expressions
(though for simplicity I will henceforth focus just on spatial terms).Wemight
understand these as ascribing primitive, undefinable, spatial properties, or as
ascribing properties definable in terms of some more basic properties
(e.g. causal structure). But Chalmers (2012, pp. 325–336) argues that the best
way to understand them is what he calls ‘phenomenal functionalism’. This
says that ‘to a first approximation, our concepts of [spatial properties] pick
out those properties that normally bring about certain spatial experiences
and judgments’ (p. 327). Phenomenal functionalism is preferable to its rivals
because, on the one hand, it far from obvious that space can be entirely
defined in more basic structural terms like causal or mathematical structure
(cf. Chalmers, 2012, p. 332; Stoljar, 2015, pp. 16–17; Alter, 2016, pp.
810–814), and because, on the other hand, treating spatial properties as sui
generis has the sceptical implication that for all we know the world might
in fact be devoid of spatial properties, with some other properties causing
us to have spatial experiences (cf. Chalmers, 2012, pp. 333–334).
However, Stoljar claims that a contradiction arises from simultaneously
endorsing NE, defining ‘structural’ to include ‘spatial’, and defining ‘spatial’
by reference to experience.
[The definition of ‘structural’ implies] that physical truths are equivalent
to various truths formulated in a certain vocabulary including spatiotem-
poral vocabulary; and phenomenal functionalism says that truths formu-
lated in spatiotemporal vocabulary are a priori equivalent to (or a priori
entail) truths about consciousness. Putting this together… physical truths
are a priori equivalent to, or a priori entail, truths about consciousness
(Stoljar, 2015, p. 15).
How is this supposed to work? Here is a first pass (simpler than what
Stoljar ends up saying) at the problematic entailment:
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1. There is an object x, with spatial properties.
2. To have spatial properties is to have properties which are the normal
causes of spatial experience.
3. Therefore, x has properties which are the normal causes of spatial
experience. (from 1 and 2)
4. If something has the properties which are the normal cause of some
event, then that event has or will happen at least once.
5. Therefore, spatial experience has or will happen at least once. (from 3
and 4)
We seem to have derived a truth about consciousness (5) from a purely
structural truth (1) together with some definitions (2 and 4). This would fal-
sify Non-Entailment. However, claim 4 is false: something need not cause
what it is the normal cause of. For instance, suppose certain mushrooms
are the normal cause of a certain distinctive human experience; nevertheless
those mushrooms might exist, with all their chemical properties, in a world
where humans never evolved.
Because properties might be the normal cause of some effect, and yet exist
in a world where that effect never comes about, we must specify which
possible worlds are being talked about. The point of NE is that from
structural facts about some world, no phenomenal facts about that world
follow. Thus, a proper formulation of the above inference, which makes
clear that 4a is false, would be:
1a There is an object x (in world w) with spatial properties.
2a To have spatial properties (in any world) is to have properties which
are (in the actual world @) the normal causes of spatial experience.
3a Therefore, x has (in w) properties which are (in @) the normal causes
of spatial experience. (from 1a and 2a)
4a If something has (in w) the properties which are (in @) the normal
cause of some event, then that event has happened or will happen at
least once (in w).
5a Therefore, spatial experience has happened or will happen at least
once (in w). (from 3a and 4a)
Stoljar recognises this difficulty, but suggests that it can be repaired by
replacing the false general claim 4a with a contingent structural claim, as
follows:
1a There is an object x (in world w) with spatial properties.
2a To have spatial properties (in any world) is to have properties which
are (in the actual world @) the normal causes of spatial experience.
3a Therefore, x has (in w) properties which are (in @) the normal causes
of spatial experience. (from 1a and 2a)
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4b The properties of object x cause (inw) what they are (in@) the normal
causes of.1
5a Therefore, spatial experience has or will happen at least once (in w).
(from 3a and 4b)
This entailment still threatens NE as long as 4b is itself a purely structural
truth. And it appears that it is – it contains causal terms (‘causes’, ‘cause of’),
logical terms (‘Theproperties of objectx’), and the term ‘normally’. This term
is thehardest toanalyse, but it seems tomean either something strictly statisti-
cal (‘Asare thenormalcausesofBs’= ‘themajorityofBsarecausedbyAs’),or
else somethingabout thedispositionsofAs (‘Asare thenormal causesofBs’=
‘As have a robust tendency to cause Bs under a range of circumstances’), or
some combination of the two.2 Since statistical terms plausibly count as
‘logical/mathematical’, and dispositional terms plausibly count as ‘causal/
nomic’, 4b seems to qualify as structural whatever we think ‘normal cause
of’means.3Thus frompurelystructural truths (1aand4b), togetherwithadef-
inition (2a),wecanderive a truthabout consciousness (5a).HenceNE is false.
Melissa Ebbers (Ebbers, n.d.) has argued that this incompatibility ramifies
further, impugning the conceivability argument directly, even though this
argument is usually framed not in terms of ‘structural’ expressions but in
terms of ‘physical’ properties. Ebbers’ argument is that Chalmers’ favoured
way of defining physical properties (2012, pp. 319–321), just like his favoured
way of defining spatiotemporal properties, involves an ineliminable reference
to experiences.4 In short, terms for properties like ‘being an electron’ are a
priori equivalent to ‘whatever property has caused a certain pattern of obser-
vations via a certain mathematically-specified structure of interaction with
other properties’. Since those ‘observations’ involve experiences, Ebbers
claims that philosophical zombie worlds turn out not to be conceivable after
all (n.d., pp. 7–11). Her reasoning is that since the physical truths about some
world are defined ultimately by reference to experiences, they can only be true
if there are some experiences to give them meaning. In a zombie world there
are no experiences, hence physical terms are meaningless, and so it cannot
be true that the zombies are physically identical to us.Hence from the fact that
the zombies are physically identical to us, it follows a priori that there must
be experiences in that world, and thus that it is not a zombie world.5 This
threatens Chalmers’ argument because he seems to accept:
Conceivability from A Priority (CAP): P& ~Q is conceivable if and only if P
does not entail Q a priori.
Given CAP, and Ebbers’ argument that physical truths a priori entail
certain experiences, it follows that zombie worlds (where physical truths
obtain without any experiences) are not conceivable. But that conceivability
claim is the first premise of the conceivability argument against physicalism.
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Although I think Stoljar’s and Ebbers’ arguments succeed with NE and
CAP defined as above, I believe that properly-qualified forms of NE and
CAP undercut them, and moreover that these qualified forms are
well-motivated, simply serving to more explicitly capture the spirit of the
original NE and CAP.6 To begin to see this, observe the special role played
in Stoljar’s argument by the actual world: we are able to draw conclusions
about experience because we are able to leverage the fact that it is by our
actual-world experiences that we fix reference to properties. The spirit of
NE, it seems to me, is not threatened by the possibility of this kind
of manoeuvre: it is meant to rule out things like a functional reduction of
consciousness, which would permit functional facts about some world to
entail phenomenal facts about that same world. But finding an explicit
formulation of this idea is tricky. Here is my proposal:
Qualified Non-Entailment (QNE):No truth about consciousness in a world
w, considered as counterfactual, is a priori entailed by any set of purely
structural truths concerning only the world w.7
This principle would rule out 4b (‘The properties of object x cause (in w)
what they are (in @) the normal causes of’), because that premise relies on
comparing the behaviour of x’s properties in the two worlds w and @. Thus
the fact that 5a follows from 1a and 4b is not a counterexample to QNE. Put
colloquially, the point is simply this: phenomenal functionalism says that
‘space’ is whatever causes certain experiences here. To know that they cause
those experiences somewhere, we would need the premise that they have the
same effects there as they do here, and QNE specifically disregards any
employment of such ‘cross-world comparisons’. QNE says simply that no
amount of structural information about things over there can entail
consciousness there.
Two phrases in QNE deserve unpacking. First, it is restricted to worlds
‘considered as counterfactual’ (as opposed to worlds ‘considered as actual’).
This distinction, drawn from Davies and Humberstone, 1980, is central to
Chalmers’ modal framework, and so appropriate to employ here. To
consider a world as actual, ‘one thinks of a possibility as representing a
way the actual world might turn out to be’, while to consider a world as
counterfactual, ‘one acknowledges that the actual world is fixed, and thinks
of a possibility as a way the world might have been but is not’ (Chalmers,
2004, p. 159).8
Second, QNE mentions ‘purely structural truths concerning only the
world w.’ This cannot simply mean ‘purely structural truths which are true
only ‘at’ the world w’, since pretty much any truth true at one world will also
be true at various others. Rather, it means ‘purely structural truths which are
true solely in virtue of how things are in worldw.’This rules out ‘cross-world
comparisons’, since their truth-conditions contain (at least) one requirement
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that something be true at one world, and (at least) one requirement that
something be true at a different world. That is (to use 4b as an example) what
matters is not which worlds 4b gets an assignment of truth relative to, but
whether its truth depends on both w and @ being certain ways.
It might be thought that Stoljar’s objection could be resurrected by simply
running the argument with an exclusive focus on the actual world: if
something has spatial properties in the actual world, there must be spatial
experiences in the actual world. I think an argument like this can work;
indeed, I think an even simpler argument also works, namely that if anything
in any world has spatial properties, then there must be spatial experiences in
the actual world – if there were none then our spatial terminology would be
meaningless (assuming phenomenal functionalism is correct). But this does
not provide a counter-example to QNE, for the argument relies on treating
the actual world as actual, i.e. allowing it to determine the meanings of
certain terms, whereas QNE specifies that worlds are to be considered as
counterfactual.
Alternatively, we might try to resurrect Stoljar’s argument by talking
about a disposition to cause spatial experiences, as follows:
1a There is an object x (in world w) with spatial properties.
2a To have spatial properties (in any world) is to have properties which
are (in the actual world @) the normal causes of spatial experience.
3a Therefore, x has (in w) properties which are (in @) the normal causes
of spatial experience. (from 1a and 2a)
4c If something has (in w) the properties which are (in @) the normal
cause of some event, then those properties confer (in any world) a
disposition to cause that event.
5c Therefore, x has (in w) a certain disposition D which is (in @)
manifested, and whose manifestation involves causing spatial
experience. (from 3a and 4c)
6c Object x manifests disposition D (in w).
7c Therefore, spatial experience has or will happen at least once (in w).
(from 5c and 6c)
Here 4c is a plausible construal of the meaning of ‘normal cause’, and 6c is
offered as a purely structural truth concerning only world w. If 7c follows,
we would thus seem to have a counterexample to QNE. However, 6c is
not in fact purely structural, since its use of the name ‘D’ is not a priori
equivalent to anything that can be said in exclusively causal, nomic,
mathematical, etc. terms. D is picked out specifically by reference to its role
in causing spatial experience in the actual world, so any description of it that
can be substituted a priori will have to mention spatial experience in the
actual world. To put it another way, the argument does not go through
a priori unless we build into the meaning of the name ‘D’, not just that it is
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a disposition bestowed by possession of spatial properties, but also that it is
manifested in the actual world. The latter fact stops this from being a
counter-example to QNE.
The response to Ebbers’ argument is similar: qualify CAP so as to
disregard a priori entailments that rely on the fact that a certain world is
actual:
Qualified Conceivability from A Priority (QCAP): P& ~ Q is conceivable if
and only if P does not entail Q a priori when all worlds are considered as
counterfactual.9
This rescues the conceivability of zombie worlds, because even though
physical truths a priori entail the existence of consciousness in the actual
world (to give meaning to physical terms), this entailment cannot be drawn
when we are considering all worlds as counterfactual – the zombie world can
be conceived of as a counterfactual possibility, which we describe using
physical terms whose meaning is fixed in the actual world, not in the world
which is being conceived of. This world contains properties that, in our own
world, cause certain kinds of experiences, but which does not do so in the
zombie world: the attribution of physical properties is true because we are
speaking a language whose meanings are fixed by the actual world, not by
the worlds we are using it to describe.
Wemight still worry that replacing NEwith QNE, and CAP with QCAP,
seems like an ad hoc fix. But we can see that it is not whenwe see that, in gen-
eral, any sort of claim about the failure of one kind of truth to a priori entail
another kind of truth, and any claim about a dissociation between two
things being conceivable, will need to be qualified in the manner of QNE
and QCAP. Without such a qualification, a counterexample can be con-
structed with sufficient ingenuity.
For instance, suppose we wish to say the following: simply from truths
about the pattern of instantiation of static shape properties, we cannot a
priori deduce truths about biology, or about happiness, or about ethics. This
is surely true, if any claim of this sort is. Correlatively, it is surely true that
any pattern of shapes could conceivably exist without life, happiness, or
rights. But now suppose that in the actual world, a certain shape is most
often instantiated by happy tortoises, who have a moral right not to be
needlessly harmed. Suppose that we name that shape ‘the T-shape’, making
it a priori that the T-shape is, in the actual world, most often instantiated by
happy tortoises, who have a moral right not to be needlessly harmed. Now
suppose we are considering a possible world w, about which we know only
the following:
Suspicious Premise (SP): The T-shape is, in w, instantiated by what it is, in
the actual world, most often instantiated by.
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This appears to be simply a claim about the instantiation of static shape
properties – that a certain pattern of similarity holds between the instantia-
tions of this particular shape in w and in @. But it follows a priori that there
is, in w, at least one tortoise, and at least one happy thing, and at least one
thing with rights. Thus we have falsified our original claim that shapes are
not enough to entail biology, happiness, or ethics. To falsify the claim that
shapes without life, happiness, or rights are conceivable, we similarly appeal
to CAP and to the a priori entailment from ‘the T-shape is instantiated by
what it is most often instantiated by’ to ‘there are happy tortoises withmoral
rights’. Both of these moves are clearly too easy: this sort of a priori
entailment is not what was ever at issue. And a way to rule it out is to rule
out cross-world premises like SP, and to base conceivability claims only on
entailments which treat no world as actual. In most cases, when we are
interested in which claims a priori entail which other claims, we are really
interested in which claims about some world can a priori entail which other
claims about that world. When this point is recognised, the inconsistencies
in the Chalmersian framework identified by Stoljar and Ebbers disappear.
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NOTES
1 Note that saying something ‘causeswhat it is the normal cause of’ is different from saying it
‘causes what it normally causes.’ If A normally causes B, that means it is rare to find A without
B; if A is the normal cause of B, that means it is rare to find B without A. Spatial properties are
the normal causes of spatial experience, but do not normally cause spatial experience: most
instances of them are unperceived and so do not cause any experiences.
2 Here is a reason for thinking that robust dispositions matter: even if it turned out that most
blue-ish experiences in human history had been caused by capricious gremlins who telepathically
induced blue-ish experiences whenever a human being was around something reflecting light in
the ‘red’ spectrum, wouldn’t we still say that the really blue things are not those which reflect
‘red’ light, but rather those which a human would see as blue in the absence of telepathic
meddling? Here is a reason for thinking that statistics matter: if it turned out that certain objects
reliably and directly produce blue-ish experiences by releasing a gas that caused synaesthesia, the
question of whether they or light-reflecting objects are ‘blue’, or simply ‘blue-seeming’ will turn
on which ones have in fact caused any, all, or most, of the blue-ish experiences in human history.
3 A slightly different possibility is that ‘the normal cause of’means ‘the most frequent cause
of under specified ‘normal’ conditions’: this would force us to ask what makes certain conditions
‘normal’, with the same three options of statistical regularity, dispositional robustness, or a
combination of the two, re-appearing.
4 More precisely, physical terms are mostly theoretical terms (with the possible exception of
a few, like ‘mass’, see Chalmers, 2012, pp. 322–324), and hence will be ‘Ramsified’ into
descriptions of their relations to each other, and to ‘Observational terms’, which include among
other things terms reporting observer’s experiences.
5 One response available to Chalmers is that even if a zombie world is inconceivable, worlds
with some zombie inhabitants are not – there are enough experiences to provide meaning to the
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physical terms used to characterise the zombies. This would still seem just as potent an objection
to physicalism, which is committed to global entailment, but it also compromises the clarity of
Chalmers’ general argument and goes against his explicit claims, so I will assume that this
fall-back position is unacceptable to him.
6 Chalmers’ own response is to say that the entailments identified by Stoljar and Ebbers are
unproblematic so long as they do not give rise to metaphysical entailments. I do not intend my
position to conflict with this, but to appeal simply to metaphysical entailment would undermine
the dialectical force of the arguments where metaphysical entailment (or its absence) is the
conclusion, and a priori entailment (or its absence) is the premise. So it is necessary to explicitly
qualify those doctrines which are usually expressed simply in terms of a priori entailments, which
is what I seek to do.
7 This could be put more formally as follows: for any world w, and any truth about con-
sciousness Q, and any set of purely structural truths P, then as long as we consider w as counter-
factual, it is never a priori that if P obtains in w, then Q obtains in w.
8 To see the difference, consider the possibility that all the samples we have identified as
water are and always have been composed of a substance chemically nothing like H2O, and
scientists have somehow misanalysed them. Considering this world as actual, we would have
to say that water is not, after all, H2O: the two have turned out to be distinct. But considering
the world as counterfactual, we should instead describe it as a case where human beings have
never encountered water (that is, H2O), but some other substance.
9 This could be put more formally as follows: P& ~ Q is conceivable if, for any world w
considered as counterfactual, it is not a priori that if P obtains in w, then Q obtains in w.
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